Thanks for the correction, Andre! Should I say instead that the 4% is the total mass of the other particles of the Standard Model (sans Higgs boson)? I want to avoid calling it "ordinary matter" or "baryonic matter". Thanks again!

Saying that the Higgs boson "gives" particles mass is, of course, just a metaphor, and any metaphor taken too far would lead to error. However, I took the risk of using the metaphor for the sake of accessibility.

Obviously, the more precise way of explaining the Higgs mechanism is by saying that the massive particle "couples" with the Higgs field, and the strength of the coupling is related to the value of the mass. I gave this explanation in the body of the article. But for the picture, I opted for the less precise but more accessible and briefer metaphor of "mass endowment".

I hope you see my point. xD

If ever I'll have a daughter in the future, I will name her Lyra.

Miguel, I guess the best reply would be 'wut?' :D

Hi Miguel,

Consider the following statements:
(1) Y exists.
(2) It is not the case that Y is ontologically posterior to some Z.
(3) Y exists necessarily.

For the sake of argument, let us agree that statement (1) is true. You believe that when I assert (2), then I am logically bound to assert (3) as also true. Likewise, you believe that the falsehood of (3) logically entails the falsehood of (2). What follows is my justification why I find the preceding line of reasoning unconvincing.

If Y = UGM, then I assert the following:
T(1) = True
T(2) = True
T(3) = False.

Notice how these assertions do not lead to a contradiction. They also have the added benefit of having valid justifications. The first assertion – the truth of (1) – is backed by scientific evidence and by the mere fact that we can argue about it. The second assertion – the truth of (2) – is suggested by the latest understanding of quantum theory. The last assertion – the falsehood of (3) – comes from the fact that ‘UGM does not exist’ does not lead to a logical contradiction.

Given these, I cannot see how your objection to the UGM’s simultaneous ontological non-contingency and logical non-necessity holds up. As best as I can see, if you want to deny the naturalistic origins of the universe, then you must deny the truth of proposition (2). But if that's the case, the falsehood of (2) should be your conclusion and not a part of your premise.

Hello Miguel,

I said:

"But does this make the universe ontologically contingent on something else? No, it does not."

However, I can now see that I should have said this instead:

"But does this make the universe-generating mechanism ontologically contingent on something else? No, it does not."

So yes, I agree with your first paragraph. After all, the decay of an atom is still contingent on the decay mechanism, indeterminacy aside.

As for your second paragraph, I believe you are again confusing the two senses of 'eternal'. By saying that the universe-generating mechanism (UGM) is eternal, I do not mean to say that it has gone spawning stuff for an infinite amount of time. Instead, what I mean is that nothing can be chronologically prior to the UGM so that there can be no "before" it and that there was never a time when it did not exist.

Also, it is easy to imagine that the UGM has constraints that will prevent it from spawning what you would call "patent absurdities". However, the fact that the UGM has constraints does not necessitate anything outside of it to set these constraints. Even if the constraints of the UGM are not logically necessary, if it is ontologically non-contingent then it does not need any explanation outside itself.

Hi Miguel!

I think we all agree now that nothing can be chronologically prior to the universe. However, I believe Garrick has made a strong case in his article that there need not be anything ontologically prior to the universe (or, if you want, to the universe-generating mechanism that spawned ours).

Let me digress a bit before expounding that point. Imagine a particular radioactive atom. According to quantum mechanics, it will decay after some time. When? We can never, even in principle, know. All we can ever know is the probability that it will decay at a particular time, beyond that the universe allows us no further knowledge.

Now let us relate the quantum randomness of radioactivity to the universe-generating mechanism. What universe will be spawned by the mechanism? Perhaps, if we have a complete cosmology (something we are still very far from having), we can have the probability that the mechanism would spawn our own universe, as well as the probability that it would spawn pink bunnies (yay!). So, is our universe necessary? If the probability that it will be generated by the mechanism is not equal to unity, then the answer is no. I think we all /suspect/ that this is correct. But does this make the universe ontologically contingent on something else? No, it does not.

Furthermore, does this make the universe-generating mechanism ontologically contingent on a personal consciousness? Again, it does not.

You see, an entity need not be logically necessary (like St. Anselm's God was supposed to be) to be ontologically non-contingent. The universe-generating mechanism might be logically non-necessary (we cannot give a logical answer to why it is the way it is), but it has no bearing on the eternity of its ontology. In other words, it can have existed for eternity (in the timeless sense, of course) and be the way it is without being as true as '3 plus 5 = 8.'

I guess it would benefit all concerned if we distinguish between the pseudoscience called 'creationism' and the theological stand called 'theistic evolutionism'; the former is scientifically falsified, the latter is scientifically unfalsifiable.

"Are you saying that that scientists shouldn't believe in creationism? Or that students who believe in creationism shouldn't be allowed in pisay?"

Science is not about belief. The fact of evolution is true whether you choose to believe on it or not. And if you ask me, I do not "believe" in evolution, I know it to be true.

So yes, a self respecting scientist should see that creationism is blatantly, absurdly false. It makes no scientific and logical sense and is contradicted by a mountain of evidence.

Miguel,

Is there any kind of creationism that can, in any way, be considered scientifically respectable? Does believing some kind of "old earth creationism" or "intelligent design theory" free one's mind from the mythological and pseudoscientific baggage inherent in creationism?