If I was your pastor, you'd still be Christian.

I doubt it's outright "bullshitting" --although, yeah it could be. I'll charitably say, however, that they simply don't know what they're talking about. Most of them study theology, but not the metaphysical framework by which the theology was derived, which only a broader philosophy of religion can clarify, so I don't really expect a lot of them, even the ones who've reached bishop-hood, to know these things.

There are other secular arguments they can rely on and should stick to --not that they're convincing, but at least they're secular.

You're right Jong; the CBCP is clearly making a religious argument not a secular one.

Natural Law comes from Thomism --the metaphysic of Aquinas (which he in turn took from Aristotle).

The problem I see for the CBCP is that not everyone subscribes to Thomistic Metaphysics, and therefore to this 'Natural Law'. Thusly, to argue, as they do, that bound everyone is by 'natural law', is to beg the question about their worldview --and their views on sexual morality, by extension-- is true, since that's exactly what's being disputed.

The problem also, unfortunately for the CBCP, gets compounded by the fact that a lot of Christians --non-Catholic Christians, that is; the non-orthodox, or non-classical ones-- don't hold to Thomism, much less, one would think, to Aquinas' 'Natural Law'. (Although they may have their own versions of it, precluding Thomism/Aquinas as a framework)

Now, perhaps the guy who made the 'Natural Law' argument can be excused; we can't expect him, or anyone --yes, even bishops-- for that matter, to be aware of how unsettled the metaphysics is, out from which the concept (natural law) was derived, so it's no surprise, that being the case, an over-generalization was made based on an annoyingly simplistic understanding of the word 'natural'.

A common rut.

(Amusingly, they could have argued they were right about contraception because Thomism is true, and would have at least avoided making a "religious argument". Not that anyone would have understood them, however.)

The irony in this is I'm Catholic.

Just based on my gut: It's probably not O.K. to ridicule people for properties that are intrinsic to them. So, insults based on someone's race, say, or his sexuality, or maybe even whatever physical deformity he may have and the like are probably not cool. However, beliefs and, obviously, actions, are fair game.

I'm of course a Christian, but people have a right to deride whatever beliefs I have, as long as the humanity of everyone is respected --so there's a line there that should be left uncrossed.

Actually, I'm confused too.

Garrick says we're not free to "consciously believe the things that we believe" since we can't change facts about the world --not to mention that, for him, determinism is true, and therefore every past state of the world has predetermined every future state-- yet he concludes that "the last thing we ought to surrender is control over our thinking to an authority or tradition."

But, our "surrender[ing]" of control should be to him, if he were to be consistent, something we don't have the power to stop --since we're, as he says, not free to "consciously believe the things that we believe".

Oh, yeah, that's it innerminds. Well, no wonder he was saying "it's just common sense [!]". Lol.

What?...

If it has "no stuff" at all, then how is it that it creates particular kinds of "stuff" and not the patently absurd ones of which we spoke. See, it has "stuff", and it's the kind of "stuff" that science can't in principle say doesn't exist on account of its inability to observe it. And if it's stuff that's "spaceless and timeless" then it's stuff that still cannot be said to be in principle ontologically non-contingent by virtue of just these features.

I'm sorry for not being clear, I wasn't saying the contentions you raise against the CA --particularly, the Kalam-- are without merit, I was saying the contentions you raise against the PSR are. And I'm afraid you're doing it again by making the conclusion its premise; it's not that "all beings will have an explanation, only if at least one necessary being exists." but that, since, so far as we know, all beings or existents have an explanation, a necessary being must therefore exist.

Suppose you say to a creationist that evolution is supported by the fossil record, and he responds by saying you're begging the question because you need evolution to be true for it to be supported by the fossil record. You would respond firstly with an open-mouthed expression of incredulity, and then you'll say that rather than providing bad grounds for believing in evolution, the fossil record furnishes us with the opposite.

In other words, you require the support of the fossil record for evolution to be true, and not the truth of evolution for the fossil record to support it. Likewise, we require beings or existents to have explanations to support the notion of a necessary being, and not a necessary being to support the notion that beings or existents have an explanation.

What the creationist could say is that the fossil record doesn't support evolution (of course, he would be wrong), and what you, in turn, could say here is that beings or existents, or, maybe, some beings or existents, don't have explanations, but, as you undoubtedly must be aware, without any supporting argument, that would just be to beg the question.

(I'm sorry! This will be my final post on this seeing as you must be exhausted by having to respond to all these lengthy arguments. I applaud you for the remarkable amount of research you've put into this. :) )

Timelessness doesn't in any way entail ontological non-contingency. If you think it does, then lay out your case. The CA --at least classical versions-- as you undoubtedly are aware, doesn't postulate timelessness as one reason for concluding the ultimate cause must be uncaused.

And the cosmological argument doesn't beg the question about contingent things having a reason for their existence --that part is presumed to be true because it is squarely supported by the evidence. What is in fact question-begging is your presumption of this premise to be "question-begging" without argumentative support. Now, you might say Quantum Mechanics shows that not everything has a cause, but, if you remember, this objection has been dealt with.

You say elsewhere there's no reason to think the Leibnizian CA is sound because it's "question-begging" as it presumes the existence of a necessary being; "the principle cannot be true if necessary beings don't exist"; "the principle can only be true if we already assume that at least one necessary being exists" But this statement is itself question-begging because the "weak form" of the PSR doesn't presume a necessary being exists, it concludes a necessary being must exist, precisely to escape an infinite ontological regress. You therefore beg the question about it's conclusion being unsound, again, without valid argumentative support.

Whether you're aware, you even imply classical CA's are sound by making the UGM out to be this "ontologically non-contingent" thing. The difference I see is that while the classical CA's use strict metaphysical demonstrations to show why something of this nature must be at the end of the line, you --assuming I'm heretofore successful in the case I've laid out-- assert the UGM is it.

Now for all we know, you may be right and the UGM is in fact it. But you've skipped a lot of steps, it seems to me, in getting to your conclusions --at least for the ontology part. And the end result, to my mind, seems more improbable for the reasons I've previously given.

Garrick,

The problem I see is that your UGM has features for which you provide no evidence; you say this UGM is "ontologically non-contingent" and has universe-making properties that are just inexplicable (which conveniently obviates certain questions about it --like why it won't create pink bunnies). You imply it's a brute fact, and while I'm not ruling out the fact that, at least in principle, it can be, you nevertheless give no reasons to support this.

The Cosmological Argument, it should be said, doesn't merely try to establish a cause that relatively differs in degree from other causes of which we can be familiar. Nor does it attempt to give an explanation for phenomena that's currently beyond science's reach.

The Cosmological Argument, as traditionally understood, evolved from attempts to demonstrate the need for causality to be undergirded by certain metaphysical preconditions. Therefore, what's being postulated by the argument is that which in principle has to exist, and that which in principle cannot be said to have had a cause. (Of course, other properties can and have been inferred, but let's overlook these for now.)

Now, it seems to me, what you're doing is you're saying, without evidence, that the UGM is it, while parrying putatively meaningful philosophical questions about its nature by saying 'it's just that way'. I hope you understand why this all seems ad hoc. (I used 'post hoc' previously, but 'ad hoc' is in fact the better word)