http://bit.ly/p56woA

sorry for spoiling the fun, meowie. ;) well, you've had your fun now, so, back in the box you go, where we can have ours.

I know the BGV to be a moot point from the moment you brought it up, but I think in these kind of discussions about 'proof' it's important that this kind of inaccuracy (from my point of view, it goes without saying) about a theorem does not go unchallenged.

XIII (emphasis mine): '[T]he basic presupposition that the BGV Theorem proves that the universe had an absolute beginning isn't wrong (and I'm sure you already know that I have quotations from Vilenkin to that effect). When you want to get into subtleties, of course there are exceptions to the theorem but the problem is that none of those exceptions work (since they universally run into intractable problems) so I'm still not wrong when I say that the BGV Theorem proves that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.'

To what effect? Well, let's consult Vilenkin.

Vilenkin: '[I]f someone asks me whether or not the theorem I proved with Borde and Guth implies that the universe had a beginning, I would say that the short answer is "yes".'

So, Yes: it implies the universe had a beginning. Does it prove the universe had an absolute beginning? Vilenkin says No. XIII says yes.

Vilenkin: '[T]he words “absolute beginning” ... raise some red flags.'

Does the theorem prove that the universe must have had a beginning?

XIII: 'Yes.'

Vilenkin: 'No. But it proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning.' ('Absolute beginning' raise some red flags.)

That 'but' subtlety is worth getting into—I think moreso by you—since it's actually that 'but' part that is of use to you: it is when you actually have him on record say anything about proofs about beginnings of some kind (except of course that he's talking about the expansion(s) itself).

We have three other relevant and competent physicists say the same thing as Vilenkin does about what the theorem does and does not prove. One would've thought the views of these authorities count for something ... esp. having seen you pull an argument from authority when it suited you when trying to knock down one of Garrick's points.

How you can still say you are not wrong in saying the theorem proves an absolute beginning to the universe beggars belief.

This is the last I'll say anything about the BGV because it looks like it might hamper discussions bet. you and Garrick on the other important—perhaps more critical—points on the personhood arguments and counter-arguments from both sides. (Unless of course this BGV crops up again, then I have no choice but to respond to it.)

Speaking of personhood... I have, I think, what may be a counter to the changeless (and/or atemporality) feature of the person-ful God, should he be the first cause, so I'll run it by you and Garrick and forego the BGV objection for now. I'll put it up, time-permitting, as soon as it's in a coherent form.

(One last thing. You stress, 'Even Garrick's UGM concedes that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.' True. But don't forget it's you who wanted to relegate the UGM into being part of the universe in the first place, so we are where we are not for anyone but yourself. :) )

XIII: ‘I keep repeating myself.’

So must I, it seems.

XIII: ‘Remember, I said that universes with an average expansion rate greater than zero must have had a beginning in the finite past. This is precisely what Vilenkin says that the theorem proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning.’

Except that's not exactly what you’ve been saying. ‘[T]he theorem shows that any universe with an expansion rate greater than zero must have had an absolute beginning … The problem is that our universe does have an expansion rate greater than zero and that means that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.’ I’m sure, or would hope that, you agree that it is critical to note the massive difference between the paper's author saying the theorem only proves a past boundary to the expansion of the universe and you (or Craig) saying the theorem proves the absolute beginning of the universe. The two statements aren’t interchangeable, but that is exactly what you are attempting to do here.

XIII: ‘This is precisely what Vilenkin says that the theorem proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning.’

Exactly … and that when asked if he thought the theorem proved the absolute beginning of the universe, the answer was ‘No.’ This stands in direct opposition to what you are—or have been—insisting that yes, the theorem proves an absolute beginning to the universe.

XIII: ‘This of course means that universes that do not have an expansion rate that is greater than zero aren't affected by the BGV Theorem.’

This is inaccurate; the universes in the three models that Garrick already mentioned are all expanding and yet evade the BGV. (Aguirre, http://bit.ly/NWi4Xr: 'What all of their theorems do are (a) write out a set of conditions which they consider to correspond to eternal inflation, then (b) show that the region in which these conditions hold is geodesically incomplete. This would indeed be consistent with eternal inflation “emerging from a primordial singularity”, but it is also consistent with eternal inflation just being grafted onto some spacetime region that is not eternally inflating by their definition.')

XIII: ‘I have been clear about this from the very beginning so any accusation of misleading is grossly inappropriate.”

…while it's perfectly fine for you to say to me to ‘[reread] the quote and not just [concentrate] on the parts that catch [my] eye’, and say that my quote of Vilenkin is a bit misleading, right? ;) Maybe it wasn't your intention, but your take of the theorem, as I've already shown, is misleading all the same.

XIII: 'This is a bit misleading. Vilenkin's reply, when asked directly what were the implications of the theorem, was that the simple answer was "yes" but that if you were willing to get into subtleties, the answer would be "no, but".'

No, not in the slightest misleading. For one, I gave a link and reference to the complete statement by Vilenkin, and second, Garrick actually provided the whole quote beforehand—after which one would find my shortened "No" quote (together with my suggestion of thinking of the BGV as pertaining more to the expansion or expanding regions). Here it is again, in full this time:

Stenger: 'Does your theorem prove that the universe must have had a beginning?'

Vilenkin: 'No.' [As in No, the theorem does not prove the universe must have had a beginning.] But it proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning.'

Your contention has always been that the BGV proved the universe must have had an absolute beginning. If there 's any misleading being done, intentional or otherwise, it's your selective quotes and your continued refusal to even acknowledge what has been said in the paper itself, clarifications by its authors, and summaries given by the other competent physicists in the field..

You really need to move on from the BGV (your misuse and misunderstanding of it) as it is clear Garrick's UGM occupies a different realm. Beyond the expanding region of spacetime of the initial inflation where the BGV ends ('What can lie beyond this boundary?') is, I think, more spacetime for you to traverse, alongside a whole host of competing (scientific) accounts*—before the UGM is in sight.

(* Perhaps here, instead of the BGV, you can make use of one of Vilenkins more recent papers, co-authored with Audrey Mithani, in which they consider cyclic evolution and the emergent universe models and come out with the same conclusion, the universe is probably past-incomplete: Did the universe have a beginning?, http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4658.)

XIII: 'Of course the assumption of the theorem breaks down at some point simply because this point is the beginning implied by the Theorem. This is why Craig is "basically correct" on his fundamental assumptions about the BGV Theorem.'

The theorem does not prove the absolute beginning of our universe, let alone the UGM being proposed by Garrick. What it does is put a 'limit' specifically (but not limited) to inflation, or a series of inflations, for the past direction.

'Inflationary spacetimes are not past-complete

I. Introduction. Inflationary cosmological models are generically eternal to the future. In these models, the Universe consists of post-inflationary, thermalized regions coexisting with still-inflating ones. ... [T]he inflating regions expand so fast that their physical volume grows exponentially with time. As
a result, there is never a time when the Universe is completely thermalized. In such spacetimes, it is natural
to ask if the Universe could also be past-eternal.'

Their answer to that question, as you very well know, is no. But more importantly, for our purposes at least, the authors later ask: 'What can lie beyond this boundary?' ...

What does that tell you?

This just doesn't tally with your claim that the theorem proves the universe had an absolute beginning. There's no exegesis needed, not by you or me, to derive any other conclusions other than that which the authors themselves (plus two other physicists whose area of expertise we're treading in) were clear in laying out. I repeat Vilenkin's subsequent clarification: 'the words “absolute beginning” do raise some red flags'; (Does your theorem prove that the universe must have had a beginning?) 'No.'

Read about inflation, and I promise you it will be clearer to you why all the physicists mentioned here are more circumspect (than you and Craig and co.) in their summary of the accounts, including their own, of the pre-inflationary universe, and that a better way (one that departs slightly from Garrick's view, I think) to think of the BGV theorem is to think of it as 'proof' that it is the inflationary expansion/s of the universe that cannot continue eternally to the past—and not that the whole universe (pre-inflation included and ToE aside) could not have.

To be clear, I'm not asking that you abandon the BGV theorem. (If anything, I find it curious that you are touting and appealing to an inflationary model of our universe. I wonder what form the theodicies and the fine-tuning arguments will take when faced with the infinite universes of inflation. But I digress.) It's just that in this case it just doesn't apply to Garrick's UGM—the theorem simply wasn't designed to give you a picture of that pre-initial inflation event. Here's the paper again:

'Whatever the possibilities for the boundary, it is clear that unless the averaged expansion condition can some-how be avoided for all past-directed geodesics, inflation
alone is not sufficient to provide a complete description of the Universe, and some new physics is necessary in order to determine the correct conditions at the boundary.'

GB: 'I must clarify that Vilenkin himself does not think that his work proves that our universe had an absolute beginning.'

XIII: 'The first quotation is ... misunderstood by many atheists to mean that Vilenkin himself doesn't believe in an absolute beginning of the universe. ... The problem is that our universe does have an expansion rate greater than zero and that means that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.'

Here is Vilenkin himself on the matter (emphasis mine):

'I would say [Craig's statement] is basically correct, except the words “absolute beginning” do raise some red flags. The theorem says that if the universe is everywhere expanding (on average), then the histories of most particles cannot be extended to the infinite past. In other words, if we follow the trajectory of some particle to the past, we inevitably come to a point where the assumption of the theorem breaks down—that is, where the universe is no longer expanding. This is true for all particles, except perhaps a set of measure zero. In other words, there may be some (infinitely rare) particles whose histories are infinitely long.'

- Stenger, Victor J. The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe is not Designed for Us. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2011. pp. 127-30 (via poster 'Teton', http://bit.ly/LgrM54)

Miguel: '[d_gently] still tries to save face by trying to make it seem like I was saying that all philosophers --all, mind you; every single philosopher-- should be consulted, and that I couldn't have possibly meant only the ones who actually have something to say about the debate --the one that the author of the article above has framed.'

59% of people in the know, who are compatibilists (aka self-deluded soft determinists) ... 71% of people in the know, who reject contra-causal free will ... 56% of people in the know, who are non-dualists ... guy in the know Eddy Nahmias—'associate professor in the Philosophy Department and the Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University' (http://www2.gsu.edu/~phlean/) and another guy in the know Sean Greenberg—'published work has focused on issues in early modern moral psychology: in particular, on conceptions of freedom, and of the passions.' (http://bit.ly/ISYyn9), both of whom bear witness to the 'the general state of play of the debates around free will' ...

— Experts before, but all now suddenly and conveniently have nothing to say about the debate? I wonder why that is....

'Then he quotes philosophers saying how libertarian free-will can't be true.'

An outright lie.

' Which he says proves the debate between determinists and non-determinists doesn't exist.'

And another one. Lies after lies after lies. I see we've gone from intellectual dishonesty to sheer dishonesty. Staying true to form, Miguel, eh?

You never disappoint. ;)

Like I said repeatedly: you're completely free to backpedal on, or even retract—in good faith—any of the claims you made in any of the threads. That route is always available to you. Do not ever think that it's too late.

To sort of summarise and then wrap this up:

Miguel: 'This book isn't smart at all. Of course it will always seem smart and water-tight for those who don't bother to actually do the research on where the debate really is.'

'Pecier, as a practical matter, we will have to appeal to authority here in a discussion about the brain, mind, and free-will.'

'And, you really ought to know that we would have more practical reasons for appealing to authority --if we needed to-- than Sam would.'

'You'll find that the consensus on [Harris' The Moral Landscape], at least among people in the know, is that it was a failure.'

'Truth is, in the free-will debate, you'll probably hear zero people cite Sam Harris [...]. Scientists will cite him, however, but that just strengthens my point: scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.'

'As for what you say about the discussion being only between compatibilism and determinism, this is not true. [...] Obviously, you'll only hear among your fellow "brights" the discussion falling between the lines of the determinists and compatibilists because those 2 sides are what fit well and fine with naturalism.'

d_gently: 'Here is the best or the closest to a consensus as we can get on the position of philosophers on free will: Accept or lean toward: compatibilism -- 59%, Other -- 14.9%, Accept or lean toward: libertarianism -- 13.7%, Accept or lean toward: no free will -- 12.2%' - The PhilPapers Surveys, http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl

'71% of 'people in the know' reject contra-causal free will.'

'[M]ost philosophers (and probably most psychologists and neuroscientists) would argue that we lack that sort of free will.' - person in the know Eddy Nahmias

'These capacities for conscious deliberation, rational thinking and self-control are not magical abilities. They need not belong to immaterial souls outside the realm of scientific understanding (indeed, since we don’t know how souls are supposed to work, souls would not help to explain these capacities). Rather, these are the sorts of cognitive capacities that psychologists and neuroscientists are well positioned to study.' - Nahmias

'This conception of [non-libertarian, non-immaterial, non-contra-casual] free will represents a longstanding and dominant view in philosophy.' - Nahmias

'[T]o establish the truth of determinism—a job better left for physics.' - Nahmias

—Accusations of 'misinterpretation!', 'quoting out of context!', 'argumentum ad populum!', 'd_gently is arguing that there is only one debate and no others exist!', 'emotional-laden ranting!', 'strawman!', and 'd_gently: all rhetoric!' later—

d_gently: 'Guy in the know, Sean Greenberg: ''Eddy's fine response, [...] neatly limns both what position is taken on free will by most philosophers and the general state of play of the debates around free will.''

Read: not contra-causal, libertarian, indeterminist and belonging to the soul, free will. Read: not between determinists and non-determinists.

Read (Greenberg again): 'Most philosophers work their way into the problem of free will by considering whether freedom is compatible with determinism.'

[That's the debate I'm talking about. [...] a specific debate, i.e., the one between determinists and non-determinists.]

After all this time you still really think your moving goalposts will fly by me unnoticed? For your own benefit (the following is obvious to readers) recall: 'Truth is, in the free-will debate, you'll probably hear zero people cite Sam Harris [...] Scientists will cite him, however, but that just strengthens my point: scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.' 'Specific debate' my ass.

[Sam Harris is irrelevant on this particular debate for the very reason that he (as far as I know) doesn't even consider the arguments contra determinism, much less argue against them.]

It's not only Sam Harris, but your very own experts. So if he's irrelevant, then so are they. You've been ignoring (apart from insinuating that atheism is to blame) the survey and the pronouncements by your people in the know.

Expert Eddy Nahmian: 'If the folk understanding of free will' ... read: the sort of free will espoused by you—contra-causal, libertarian, indeterminist and belonging to the soul ... 'then most philosophers (and probably most psychologists and neuroscientists) would argue that we lack that sort of free will.'

'Even if neuroscience and psychology were in a position to establish the truth of determinism a job better left for physics—this would not establish bypassing.'

Another guy in the know, Sean Greenberg, reveals: 'Eddy's fine response, [...] neatly limns both what position is taken on free will by most philosophers and the general state of play of the debates around free will.'

Read: not contra-causal, libertarian, indeterminist and belonging to the soul, free will. Read: not between determinists and non-determinists.

Read (Greenberg again): '[M]ost philosophers work their way into the problem of free will by considering whether freedom is compatible with determinism.'

[So I'm supposed to acknowledge a "study" that shows most philosophers are determinists, so you would be magically correct about everything you said, ...]

Miguel: Look, Sam Harris not real expert! Look this way, to the Philosophers, the real experts!

Me: Okay! * Shows Miguel said real experts *

Miguel: No, d_gently, foul!

[ .... despite that it has nothing to do with anything I was arguing for.]

'Nothing to do'... Funny that.

Miguel, to Pecier: 'As a practical matter, we will have to appeal to authority here in a discussion about the brain, mind, and free-will.' ... 'You really ought to know that we would have more practical reasons for appealing to authority --if we needed to-- than Sam would.'

[Your subsequent paragraphs aren't even objective reactions to anything I've said. It's just more of your emotional-laden rantings about how I've offended "science", how I've argued that the "real debate" is between determinists and non-determinists, ]

Miguel: 'This book isn't smart at all. Of course it will always seem smart and water-tight for those who don't bother to actually do the research on where the debate really is.'

(To Garrick) 'As for what you say about the discussion being only between compatibilism and determinism, this is not true. Soft Determinists still have a lot of self-deluding to do to harmonize their conclusions with reality. [...] Obviously, you'll only hear among your fellow "brights" the discussion falling between the lines of the determinists and compatibilists because those 2 sides are what fit well and fine with naturalism.'

Garrick's—and Harris', and, by extension, Pecier's—survey of the free will debate is actually correct, or closer to, the actual debate landscape among philosophers. Read (again): guy in the know Sean Greenberg.

Which then makes you wrong.

Do you not follow still?

[Because saying "*where* the debate really is" is exactly the same as saying "*what* the debate really is". Genius. The latter is what you want people to *think* I'm saying, to justify all the exaggeration and ground shifting you've done for rhetorical effect. Because, clearly, alongside the context of the article, I was saying *where* the debate is BETWEEN the determinists and non-determinists.]

Which is—and for throughout this thread, actually—Miguel-speak for Oh, Shit I Was Wrong But No Not Really Because What You Say I Said Is Not Really What I Said And This Is All Your Fault So No I'm Not Wrong.

[Let's remind ourselves again that reading comprehension should be easy enough if one actually exerted the minimal amount of effort to it. I clearly said scientists can give us invaluable information about the brain.]

'Equally' (not really), you also said they have no business in the free will debate. 'Scientists will cite him, however, but that just strengthens my point: scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.' (Don't think I didn't notice the late (face-saving) addition of the qualifier 'invaluable'. ;) )

It's okay to backpedal and admit to it, Miguel. In any case, our readers will know the reasons for your doing so (or not doing so).

[It seems you're under the impression that there's just one debate on the issue of free-will. The issue was framed in the context of theism vs atheism. One need only read the actual article we're commenting under. And, your inability to be cognizant of the other sides, or, for that matter, other debates, within the issue, doesn't mean they don't exist. ]

So, first, it' really me who's appealing to authority. Now, I'm also the one who is ignorant by insisting there is, or must be, only one real debate within the free will issue. Apparently.

It's probably also me who has said the following: 'Of course it will always seem smart and water-tight for those who don't bother to actually do the research on where the debate really is.' Yes, it must be me who said this.

[[M]aybe you just put too much stock in superlatives despite the very informal setting in which the discussion is taking place, making one wonder how you fare in everyday conversation.]

Like I said, you're completely free to backpedal on, or even retract, any of the claims you made in any of the threads.

[But yes, I do sign on to the idea, as does Harris, that the compatibilists' free-will is incoherent.]

Yes you do; no you don't to the fact that the people in the know you told us to consult think, as does Harris and and the relevant science/scientists, that your idea of free will—the contra-causal free will of a non-physical soul—is incoherent.