IntenseDebate - Greg Restall

14 years ago @ consequently.org - Testing, testing, 1, 2... · 0 replies · +1 points

Well, in the paper I explain why I don't think that the two-dimensional semantics, in which points are pairs of worlds, is fundamental. It's interesting that the hypersequent system gives you the same logic.

But I don't understand question 2: truth (in general) is defined at pairs of worlds. Necessary A is true at <w,v> iff A is true at <w,v'> for every world v'. This includes v, so if Necessary A holds at <w,v> then A holds at <w,v> too.

15 years ago @ consequently.org - consequently.org/writi... · 0 replies · +1 points

I haven't decided on licensing yet. I'm still in discussions with a potential publisher, and it will be up to what we can both agree on.

15 years ago @ consequently.org - Testing, testing, 1, 2... · 0 replies · +1 points

Well, Jeff Horty couldn't make it from Florida, due to the blizzards in Boston. (Once your flight from Florida is bumped, you're not getting another one for a week, apparently. They are that overbooked.) But Johan and I made it from the easier-to-get-to-Boston starting points of Amsterdam and Hong Kong respectively, and we had a decent enough crowd. I waved my arms a lot and said things like 'soundness and completeness theorems are there for a reason' and 'equal rights for proofs along with models' and 'proof theory can play a semantic role, too' while motivating a sequent calculus for 2D modal logic, saying nice things about Nuel's treatment of tonk, and occasionally muttering darker words about 'normative pragmatics' and sounding like I was some of the other people from the Pittsburgh area. Whether that added up to anything I'll leave for other people to tell. At least Jon Cogburn got something out of the session, and others seemed to like it too.

JvB told jokes, was very dynamic (in both senses of the words) and was much more radical than me, saying logic should include all forms of cognitive dynamics. He was great and I'm not doing what he said justice, but I came first and I then suffered from post-talk ennui, which is never a good time for me to absorb someone else's talk.

15 years ago @ consequently.org - Testing, testing, 1, 2... · 0 replies · +1 points

Nobody from Bulgaria has invited me yet. I'd love to visit.

15 years ago @ consequently.org - Testing, testing, 1, 2... · 0 replies · +1 points

I’ll try to keep everyone informed. I’ll try posting here in between talks and catching up with people. Are you making your way across to the APA? The closest I’ll get to Calgary is somewhere in high up, between LA and Boston, I’m afraid. This is a very quick visit.

16 years ago @ consequently.org - Time Flies | consequen... · 0 replies · +1 points

Allen's already there. I hope your paths cross soon.

16 years ago @ consequently.org - Always More... | conse... · 0 replies · +1 points

That's an interesting point. The cardinality objection is a slightly
different one to this problem, however. Even if we maintain a cap on
the size of worlds (or limit worlds in some other way), if # is
definable, not every set of worlds can count as a proposition.

16 years ago @ consequently.org - consequently.org/writi... · 0 replies · +1 points

Thanks, Andrzej! I'll be sure to add these references. They're really helpful.

16 years ago @ consequently.org - Always More... | conse... · 0 replies · +1 points

Hi Laureano:

Yes, that definition of #A is badly worded. The intention is this:
take the sentences equivalent to A. For each sentence in this set,
take the sentence letters not occurring in that sentence. (This is
clearly non-empty, since none of the sentences contain every sentence
letter.) Then take the first sentence letter in that list.

That's what I meant to write, and my wording is bungled. Changing the
any to some correct the wording too.

I hope that helps.

16 years ago @ consequently.org - Rumfitt on Multiple Co... · 0 replies · +1 points

You're right, that is a possible response. I don't want to say that
any bit of an argument is itself an argument (imagine stopping mid-
sentence.)

But I would want to say that if stopping at some point gives
you something with a recognisable structure (as these cases admit),
and something whose validity can be interpreted in a perspicuous way
(as happens in these cases), where this can play a role in the general
account of argument structures (as it can in here), then there's
something going for it.

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