gdp's Comments

Filipino Freethinkers : Are We Free to Believe?

Tue, 10 Jul 2012 12:23:15 +0000

Ah, I see. You are saying that even in a possible world (W) where both the resurrection (R) and it's sole deliverance by the RCC (C) are facts, it would not be the case that a person with free will can arrive at those beliefs for no reason at all. Even in a possible world where perusing Pascal's Wager results in a favorable outcome, it would not be the case that the Wager is a good argument for believing in R and C because we are, ourselves, wired in such a way such that it would be against our nature to have beliefs that are contrary to facts (and that these facts are outside of our control). Did I get that right?

Filipino Freethinkers : Are We Free to Believe?

Tue, 10 Jul 2012 04:14:21 +0000

He did say that one need not be a determinist or a compatibilist in order to agree with him though which is why I did not pursue that line of thought. The problem though is that aside from an argument against free will, I can see no other obvious point that the article is making (other than Jane) so I asked for a clarification.

Filipino Freethinkers : Are We Free to Believe?

Tue, 10 Jul 2012 03:47:57 +0000

Cheers, Garrick. Are you saying that Jane is being irrational for being a Catholic (and that she is not exercising her free will by being one)?

Filipino Freethinkers : Quantum Queries: Is Ours A Clockwork Universe?

Wed, 4 Jul 2012 03:46:27 +0000

My sentiments precisely.

Filipino Freethinkers : Rep. Raymond Palatino, Another Victim of Catholic Bullies

Tue, 3 Jul 2012 03:08:19 +0000

I don't think he's saying that secularism is intolerant by nature, just that there is a tendency by secularists to be intolerant. Take, for example, your average internet militant atheist for whom intolerance is basically the norm (just aimed at different targets, e.g. religion). That's not an unreasonable observation. Secularists aren't immune to the defects found in your average fundamentalist. For example, the USSR.

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Sat, 23 Jun 2012 03:41:25 +0000

1. From James Sinclair, "One can avoid this, as the Aguirre-Gratton model does, by reversing the arrow of time at the boundary (as Vilenkin told AA). But if you do this, then the mirror universe on the other side of the BVG boundary in no sense represents a past out of which our current universe evolved. Thus our universe would begin-to-exist, should the A-theory of time be true." James also points out, "the Aguirre-Gratton model is not even suggested by its authors to be a model of our universe. Rather, they hope that it can serve as a springboard for the birth of our universe through some other physical process (some of which they briefly mention in their academic paper)". Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/current-cosmology-... 2. What Craig means by "topologically prior" can be understood by taking it to mean "causally prior", that is, the story of the evolution of the universe includes the state that is prior to the origination of time (and by implication, the universe). However, I too am having problems with this as it strikes me as being circular.

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Sat, 23 Jun 2012 03:25:54 +0000

Part 2 And finally, there's: (4) Conceptual analysis of the properties of this first cause yields characteristics that are of theological significance. This one is where our chief disagreement lies. You maintain that (4) is plausibly false by virtue of the fact that this hypothetical first cause need not be a personal mind. This implies that nothing of theological signifiance actually follows from the initial conclusion (3) of the KCA. An ultramundane cause of the universe that is not a person but is enormously powerful, timeless, spaceless, immaterial, beginningless, changeless, uncaused need not actually have any notable theological implications since a UGM seems a perfectly plausible alternative. I've three problems with this conclusion: 1. It does not follow from the fact that the FC need not be a person that the FC is, in fact, non-personal. It's a non-sequitur. There's a large difference between a KCA that fails completely in proving theism to a KCA that points to an FC that might be God. 2. You point out that conceding that probabilistic causes are possible is sufficient to explain how a temporal effect could have come from a timeless cause. This is false (though I missed it before) since the FC is changeless (at the very least, prior to the universe's origination). The FC is changeless because an infinite regress of events is impossible (and change is an event). This prima facie rules out probabilistic causation as regards to the FC. 3. Moreover, change implies temporality as the UGM transitions from one probabilistic event to the other (that either actualizes or fails to actualize). A further postulate necessary for your probabilistic UGM is, in fact, the existence of time (directly contradicting some of your earlier statements). In fact, a succesion of events is pretty much definitive of what time is (especially on the relational view). The arguments for the personhood of the FC stills stands. Cheers. :)

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Sat, 23 Jun 2012 03:22:30 +0000

Part1 Let's recap. Let's deal with each premise in turn and address your objections to each in turn. (2) The universe began to exist. Much of the confusion stems from the fact that we seem to be using two different definitions for the word 'universe' so let's define it here. I propose that the most plausible definition of the word 'universe', as contained within the discourses typically broached when discussing the KCA, would be as 'the set of all contingent objects (whether abstract, platonic or concrete)'. This does not, for example, rule out your UGM. Much of my reservations (regarding your objections) are also rendered moot since we are, it seems to me, in agreement that the universe began to exist but differ as regards to what caused it. That brings us to the first premise: (1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause. Self-explanatory. This is the metaphysical underpinnings that provide the foundation of the KCA and what differentiates it from other formulations of the Cosmological Argument. This is basically a non-local Causal Principle (CP) Again, we seem to be in agreement here since your UGM postulation requires this premise to be true. (3) Therefore, the universe has a cause. Shouldn't be controversial since this conclusion necessarily follows from the truth of premises (1) and (2) which seems to me that we are in agreement on.

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Sat, 23 Jun 2012 03:02:17 +0000

Sorry but I can't really reply as much as I want to as IntenseDebate is pushing me to my wit's end (what with these constant "your login session has expired" and "your connections has timed out" crap). I literally am rendered incapable of posting most of the time. Anyway, the Aguirre-Gratton Model is a model that evades the theorem by stipulating that "the arrow of time reverses at the t = –infinity hypersurface, so the universe ‘expands’ in both halves of the full de Sitter space". In other words, time flows in both directions (both 'forwards' and 'backwards') from the initial singularity. The problem? As Craig points out, the other side of the de Sitter space is not our past. The other side of the de Sitter space bears no temporal relation with anything on our side (not even the possibility of it). Besides, as Craig surmises, the primary reason this scenario fails is that "this gross reconstruction of time denies the evolutionary continuity of our universe which is topologically prior to t and our universe".

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Sat, 23 Jun 2012 00:55:20 +0000

1. Even Garrick's UGM concedes that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.. Anyway, the basic presupposition that the BGV Theorem proves that the universe had an absolute beginning isn't wrong (and I'm sure you already know that I have quotations from Vilenkin to that effect). When you want to get into subtleties, of course there are exceptions to the theorem but the problem is that none of those exceptions work (since they universally run into intractable problems) so I'm still not wrong when I say that the BGV Theorem proves that the universe must have had an absolute beginning. Here, let me simplify it for you: (1) If the exceptions to the GBV Theorem do not work, then the BGV Theorem proves that the universe must have had an absolute beginning. (x -> y) (2) The exceptions don't work. (x) (3) Therefore, the BGV Theorem proves that the universe must have had an absolute beginning. (∴y) 2. They evade the theorem because their average expansion rates aren't greater than zero. 3. That remains to be proven, of course. :)

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Thu, 21 Jun 2012 11:16:45 +0000

I never meant to imply that you believed the universe isn't expanding.

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Thu, 21 Jun 2012 02:13:47 +0000

@d.gently I never denied that Garrick's UGM doesn't evade the BGV Theorem. I keep repeating myself. Remember, I said that universes with an average expansion rate greater than zero must have had a beginning in the finite past. This is precisely what Vilenkin says that the theorem proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning. This of course means that universes that do not have an expansion rate that is greater than zero aren't affected by the BGV Theorem. I have been clear about this from the very beginning so any accusation of misleading is grossly inappropriate.

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Wed, 20 Jun 2012 06:16:33 +0000

Cyclic models have an entropy problem, for example, while static models that give rise to the universe via quantum fluctuations are themselves metastable and thus past-finite. On a side note, this quasi-static metastable quantum vacuum (with an expansion rate of zero) is really quite similar to your UGM with the important distinction that it's still spatio-temporal. And how exactly would this "nothing" (your UGM), that is timeless and spaceless, have causal powers anyway? Quantum Mechanics breaks down past the singularity for the very simple reason that the realm wherein Quantum Mechanics operates ceases to exist (there being no space nor time). You are essentially redefining what Quantum Mechanics is if you're proposing it can operate timelessly and spacelessly. The UGM you are proposing is completely ad hoc (that is, it's arbitrary in it's properties). Krauss' nothing is not nothing, as you yourself admit, and yet you keep extrapolating it past the singularity when Krauss' nothing presupposes space and time.

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Wed, 20 Jun 2012 04:50:18 +0000

@D.Gently D.Gently: "What it does is put a 'limit' specifically (but not limited) to inflation, or a series of inflations, for the past direction." That, however, is precisely the reason the BGV Theorem implies an absolute beginning (since the expansion cannot be past-eternal). This is why virtually all the exceptions to the BGV Theorem posit an average expansion rate ≤0. Garrick's UGM, for example, is completely static (it's expansion rate is not greater than zero) which is how he proposes it evade the implications of the BGV Theorem. The problem is that these exceptions are universally plagued with intractable problems such that they hardly furnish us with proven alternatives to the implications of the BGV Theorem. D.Gently: "I repeat Vilenkin's subsequent clarification: 'the words “absolute beginning” do raise some red flags'; (Does your theorem prove that the universe must have had a beginning?) 'No.'" This is a bit misleading. Vilenkin's reply, when asked directly what were the implications of the theorem, was that the simple answer was "yes" but that if you were willing to get into subtleties, the answer would be "no, but". There are indeed ways to circumvent the universe's having a beginning as I've always conceded from the beginning. This is why Craig actually devotes several pages discussing these exceptions to the theorem in his article in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Garrick: "Again, to clarify what all these scientists are saying, Vilenkin and Guth included, our universe is subject to the BGV theorem, the non-expanding era of space-less and timeless nature is NOT." The problem with your UGM is that it's incoherent. The Laws of Physics merely true propositions that describe how the universe operates and propositions have no causal powers. To illustrate, take Newton's Law of Universal Gravity and let's call it G: "that every point mass in the universe attracts every other point mass with a force that is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them". Now, does G, a proposition that describes how gravity operates, cause the Earth to pull at the moon? No, it does not. What it does is describe the reason why the Earth pulls at the moon (that reason being gravity). It is not the proposition G that causes the pulling motion but gravity. Even if we were to concede that your proposed UGM is Platonic, it still wouldn't solve this problem of causal inefficacy.

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Wed, 20 Jun 2012 04:24:41 +0000

I'm starting a new comment branch since this shortening of comment space annoys me. Kindly reply there please. Cheers. :D

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Tue, 19 Jun 2012 03:11:37 +0000

I'd suggest rereading the quotation, D.Gently. You might just find that nothing Vilenkin said contradicts anything I said. Of course the assumption of the theorem breaks down at some point simply because this point is the beginning implied by the Theorem. This is why Craig is "basically correct" on his fundamental assumptions about the BGV Theorem. In other words, "the histories of most particles cannot be extended into the infinite past". Like I said, I suggest rereading the quote and not just concentrating on the parts that catch your eye. P.S. @Garrick, I'm preparing a pretty lengthy reply on the points you raise so it might take some time. Cheers. :D

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Mon, 18 Jun 2012 08:24:57 +0000

What you're calling the UGM is now misleading because what you call the UGM (as you now apply the term) is no longer a universe generating mechanism but a part of the universe (since it's not 'nothing). The first quotation is the stock-standard reply whenever a KCA proponent brings up the BGV Theorem and it is, of course, misunderstood by many atheists to mean that Vilenkin himself doesn't believe in an absolute beginning of the universe. Here's why: 1. To say that would be basically saying that Vilenkin is suffering from cognitive dissonance since in the very same book, Vilenkin goes on to say that, "There is no escape, they have to face the problem of a cosmic beginning". (Many Worlds in One, p.176) 2. Vilenkin's "No, but" is, in fact, already incorporated in my initial assertion. Remember, I said that the BGV theorem proves that all universe with a past expansion rate greater than zero (which are pretty much the only cosmic scenarios that evade the implications of the theorem). The problem is that our universe does have an expansion rate greater than zero and that means that the universe must have had an absolute beginning. 3. What about your second quotation? What Vilenkin is talking about here is his pet theory of cosmic beginnings that Craig calls "quantum tunneling" where he tries to provide a plausible version of the universe's origination with neither an efficient nor a material cause. The problem here is that, as Vilenkin points out, the "nothing" that would produce this hypothetical universe is not, in fact, "nothing" but a "something" (a theory competely at odds with his contention of an absolute beginning to the universe). Thus, he draws the mistaken inference (just as you have) that the "laws of physics must have existed, even though there was no universe" (Many Worlds in One, p.186) His problem is the same as yours in that he fails to realize that the Laws of Physics are causally effete because they are merely descriptions of how physical objects operate.

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Mon, 18 Jun 2012 05:22:00 +0000

1. This clarifies things a bit: the crux of your argument is Krauss' theory (crudely summarized as there being a pre-existent quantum vacuum which formed the basis of a non-personal universe generating mechanism). Krauss' theory hinges on the possibility of the 'nothing' that exists before the universe's origination is not metaphysical 'nothing' (as I see it) but rather a something 'nothing' (if that makes sense). It's not question-begging per se but it's still a pretty weak argument. More on this below. 2. The problem with Krauss' theory is that the Bord-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem applies even to Krauss' hypothetical pre-existing quantum vacuum (since the Theorem shows that any universe with an expansion rate greater than zero must have had an absolute beginning). Krauss' theorem doesn't solve the problem of absolute cosmic beginnings, it merely pushes the problem up one story (in the sense that even the quantum vacuum had to have had a cause). This has actually been the subject of a debate between Dr. William Lane Craig and Dr. Lawrence Krauss last year (titled, IIRC, "Is there evidence for the existence of God?"). When Craig pointed out that even Krauss' hypothetical quantum vacuum must have had an absolute beginning, Krauss had no answer (instead appealing that we should just basically do more research and trust in the 'powers' of science). There's a debate transcript on www.reasonablefaith.org if you're interested.

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Mon, 18 Jun 2012 05:13:27 +0000

Yep, but it's a weak form of the PSR only in the sense that it's relatively restricted (being applied only on contingent facts). So far as I know, the PSR has never been formulated to include only deterministic explanations (even during Liebniz' time).

Filipino Freethinkers : The Eternal Universe

Sat, 16 Jun 2012 15:09:08 +0000

Yep, it does (need an explanation) and that explanation is that the nature of the quantum vacuum (probabilistic) is the reason that one state of affairs obtained and another didn't.