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		<title>gdp's Comments</title>
		<language>en-us</language>
		<link>https://www.intensedebate.com/users/318220</link>
		<description>Comments by Neva</description>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : How Disruptive Behavior by Employees Can Devastate a Workplace - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=3217#IDComment608227441</link>
<description>I, too, find this process troubling, perhaps not for quite the same reasons.  Disruptive individuals can create havoc in the workplace.  Professionalism Committees -- panels of judgement most likely occupied by sometimes disruptive, less-than-perfect individuals -- adds another layer of dysfunction (and cost) akin to the Victorian school-room paradigm of annual performance reviews -- one of the most disruptive and negative bottom-line eaters in the workplace today.  A disruptive worker may have to be called, but a private meeting with his/her manager (who should have been vetted for communication skills before being promoted) would be far more constructive and less damaging.  I believe in drilling down on issues to find root causes.  Disruptive workplaces drill down to mismanagement, whether it be not encouraging innovative and creative thinking, not holding briefing and debriefing sessions, tolerating gossip in the workplace,  promoting non-communicators or micro-managers to management positions, tolerating tiered structures, etc. I could go on and on.  They are all management issues, result in disruptive behavior and create awful environments for workers to spend their days. </description>
<pubDate>Sun, 31 Mar 2013 15:00:57 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=3217#IDComment608227441</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : Cable TV Follows Its Subscribers to the Internet - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2295#IDComment28067009</link>
<description>I cut off my cable subscription and fled to the internet, because of the outrageous cable fees charged for mindless, bottom-feeding, bundled cable programs.  I sincerely hope cable won&amp;#039;t crowd out the interesting and intelligent online videos, documentaries and movies of my own choice that I now watch on line for much, much less than the cable fees I used to pay, </description>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2009 12:30:57 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2295#IDComment28067009</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : One Way to Lower Health Costs: Pay People to Be Healthy - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2266#IDComment25743749</link>
<description>Good post, Frank, but tough to fight  politically correct whiners.  Look at all the fuss smokers make about having to pay additional taxes on their smokes. </description>
<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2009 15:40:41 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2266#IDComment25743749</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : One Way to Lower Health Costs: Pay People to Be Healthy - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2266#IDComment25743555</link>
<description>Great point!  The beginning and end of the monetary incentive idea. </description>
<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2009 15:37:01 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2266#IDComment25743555</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : One Way to Lower Health Costs: Pay People to Be Healthy - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2266#IDComment25743501</link>
<description>Healthy people who live longer don&amp;#039;t use the healthcare system. </description>
<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2009 15:35:59 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2266#IDComment25743501</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : One Way to Lower Health Costs: Pay People to Be Healthy - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2266#IDComment25743414</link>
<description>A much quicker and more immediate incentive which would cost a whole lot less:  Enrol in exercise programs, nutrition classes and quit smoking or lose your job. </description>
<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2009 15:34:01 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2266#IDComment25743414</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : Leaving \&#039;Friendprints\&#039;: How Online Social Networks Are Redefining Privacy and Personal Security - </title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2262#IDComment24041415</link>
<description>Part 2  HR minions might furtively check for on-line photos and posts, because all the other HR minions are doing it.  So they find photos of a wild bikini beach party &amp;ndash; champagne flowing.  So what?  The applicant may have the networking skills to double sales; the mind to shift the paradigm for the lacklustre business model.  The other day, on the Internet, I saw a photo of a naked woman riding Richard Branson&amp;#039;s back.  Wise interviewers will find out all they need to know through the application process; not by stalking the applicant in cyberspace.  Imagine if Barack Obama had been afraid of losing his privacy on-line!  </description>
<pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2009 14:28:00 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2262#IDComment24041415</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : Leaving \&#039;Friendprints\&#039;: How Online Social Networks Are Redefining Privacy and Personal Security - </title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2262#IDComment24041339</link>
<description>Part 1  Advertising ourselves on-line is no different from advertising ourselves off-line &amp;ndash;just expanded -- turned into paranoia by frightened baby boomers and taken up by young professionals eager to turn fear into money.  Every day net workers give out their business cards with more information than many give out while blogging, networking and chatting on-line.  Excellent employees network and party with business associates, clients and strangers all the time, shedding personal information along the way.  For credibility and trust, on-line entrepreneurs have to be prepared to give out their contact information.  On-line writers have to be prepared to stand by what they write, not hide under pseudonyms in the cyber shadows.  Continued.... </description>
<pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2009 14:27:01 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2262#IDComment24041339</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : Why Economists Failed to Predict the Financial Crisis - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234#IDComment21456679</link>
<description>Part 3  (3)  Arrogance, Academia and Theoretical Mathematical Models  The founders of Long-Term Captal Management included Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton, who along with Fischer Black, invented the Black-Scholes fairy option pricing model.  Other elite included David Mullins, once a vice chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Eric Rosenfeld from MIT and Harvard.  Myron Scholes boasted they would make money by being a vacuum sucking up nickels that no one else could see. (*)  LTCM&amp;#039;s strategy was arbitrage and relative value convergence trading &amp;ndash; hedging systematic risk to zero, using computer and theoretical models.   Lesson:  Academic models, theories and assumptions fail miserably in the real world.  Academic arrogance has no place on Wall Street.  </description>
<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 17:00:52 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234#IDComment21456679</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : Why Economists Failed to Predict the Financial Crisis - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234#IDComment21456647</link>
<description>Part 2   (2) 25% bonuses on Profits   The enormous success of the arbitrage group at Salomon emboldened Meriwether to demand a new form of compensation: 15% share of profits for his traders. When he started LTCM, this practice increased to 25% -- all over and above management fees. Apparently 20% is now routine.   Lessons: (a) The temptation for huge risks with other people&amp;#039;s money when the rewards are outrageous by any normal standards of decency. (***) (b) It is the fiduciary duty for portfolio managers to maximize profits for their clients. That goal, then, should be inherent in fund management. Pocketing any percentage of the profits is completely counter to that fiduciary duty. Their compensation should come out of their management fees. </description>
<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 17:00:15 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234#IDComment21456647</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : Why Economists Failed to Predict the Financial Crisis - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234#IDComment21456603</link>
<description>Part 1  There are more lessons than you mention in the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) fiasco:  lessons not learned and repeated in the current financial crisis.  (1)  Slack Regulation/Deception and the start of LTCM  John Meriwether, a bond trader, ran a very successful arbitrage group at Salomon Brothers.  One of his traders confessed to making a false bid on treasuries.  Meriwether reported it, but no disciplinary action was taken.  Turned out the bonder trader had lied.  It was not a one-time deviation.  Meriwether took the heat and was fired.  He started LTCM.  Lesson:  Compliance and risk management not a priority at Salomon.  (Had it been a priority LTCM would not have happened.) </description>
<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 16:59:20 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234#IDComment21456603</guid>
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<title>Knowledge@Wharton : Outrage over Outsized Executive Compensation: Who Should Fix It and How? - Knowledge@Wharton</title>
<link>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2151#IDComment14830774</link>
<description>What on earth is the point of non-binding shareholders&amp;#039; approval?  Binding or non-binding, who are the major shareholders?  Often fund companies whose managers are grossly over compensated themselves.____Stock options are a good alternative to direct overcompensation, as long as they are long term plans and all employees have an opportunity to participate proportionately.____In my view, it is extremely distasteful when senior executives are hugely overcompensated, while the front-end salespeople and customer service representatives, who bring in the revenues to pay those bloated pay packages, are paid minimum, non-living wages.  Unfortunately, it will take far more than the fa&amp;ccedil;ade of shareholders&amp;#039; approval to bring executive pay back to acceptable levels.  Greedy, irresponsible and often incompetent executives, themselves, are paving the way for on-going legislated caps on executive compensation.____The financial meltdown has brought executive compensation to the forefront, but more relevant to the current meltdown are the greedy hedge fund, private equity and investment banking players who pocket outrageous commissions on borrowed money, without any risk to themselves.  Now with lower interest rates, they are poised for another run. </description>
<pubDate>Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:06:44 +0000</pubDate>
<guid>http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2151#IDComment14830774</guid>
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