Marcuse’s article shows that what is critically rational also alters, because earlier the principle of individualism that considered self-interest as rational, and greatly valued autonomous thinking as a critical approach, ended up setting the individual against the society, and its resolution in the capitalistic system, again lead to the alienation of the individual. Since we now would see the individualistic rationality proposed earlier as transformed into technological rationality (as your quote points to), our present conception of critical thought would differ (since we don’t want to promote the same self interest which leads to the large corporations, and the creation of more jobs with “standards pertaining to predetermined tasks and functions.”). Hence, I don’t think that critical thought has become impotent, because a critical thought can never be the norm, or else it would merely be complying with the present system.

Marcuse shows that with a new social processes coming up, our basis for reasoning and approval alter based on what are new values are. And this is making a broader point to me about reason in general. While we earlier considered different individualistic aspirations as reasonable, now, we can reasonably conclude how we are actually being free and autonomous in holding corporate jobs and choosing amidst wide range of technical professions, even though we are merely serving the social apparatus. This adherence to the prevailing trends in a community has probably always been the case, and I wonder if the present technological social process is especially different in urging conformism with the technological truth than in previous times. This makes me question the infallibility and objective claim accorded with reason and rationality. Since what we find reasonable keeps changing, reason becomes a poor basis for determining what’s right.

I think in showing this contingent nature of reason (if such an interpretation by me is correct), Marcuse makes his earlier argument about surplus repression’s removal leading to freedom weaker. Ryan, in his post Rationality and the Public Sphere, shows how in being reasonably argued, law doesn’t remain a tool of domination by the prince, but the restriction of behaviour by law becomes liberating. However, if reason itself is just a way of reinforcing the prevalent norms, and rationality just rationalizes the interests of those in power, then the domination by society continues, and we would still feel suppressed.

This might be the reason why Critical Theorists are anti-foundationalists. Critiquing has a constructive dimension to itself because it equips us with the ability to recognize the danger of the present system, and to neither blindly use nor be manipulated by the technological apparatus. Marcuse’s perspective feels more negative, suggesting that we cannot be happy in the present state, until we reach that mark of ‘abundance’. This new solution he proposes would have us adopt the attitude that once we reach that state of abundance, we’ll all be freer and hence don’t have to worry about being suppressed anymore. Such an attitude would make us too complacent and hence compliant; therefore the importance of critical thinking is always going to be there, and no such solution can exist. Instead, critical though can provide the means to leaving a free life in any context, despite no utopic solution existing.

Joe, I find your post extremely helpful because it very clearly unravels the issue of emergency by explaining the general nature of an emergency (as the disturbance of out “ordinary temporal existence” which is “automated and anticipatory”), and connecting it to the idea of the reminiscence of the past in the present. The emergency can then be seen not just with its aspect of urgency, but as an emergence from the “piling wreckage”. His interpretation of the Klee painting shows the conflicting pull the angel experiences, as it is thrusts towards the future, towards which it’s back is turned, while “fixedly contemplating” the past. The storm, in representing progress, seems to show how we are forcedly thrust into progress by an external agent, and don’t deliberately pursue it. I try to connect this with the Marcuse readings, where progress in technology etc is a part of our social set up and we are creating as well as being changed by technology. I think that for the real state of emergency the angel would have to emerge out of this storm, in which case “its past become(s) citable in all its moments”, as for the redeemed mankind (254).

A simple answer that I have deduced from Marcuse is that these advancements are a way of creating greater distractions and hence continuing to bind man’s spirit. Just as you point out Freud’s words that men in the past probably felt the same basic problems, I think the present advancements of technology also probably don't hold any more hope of us leading better lives. The attitude and the social organization that needs to be formed for humans to live liberated and not constrained lives would need to develop irrespective of technology (even if technology can be useful in this process). Although I was not able to see a direct relevance between the title of your post and the content, there is an attitude and an outlook that the title advices, which can might answer your last question.

Marcuse’s solution to the problem of humans leading repressed lives is that there is some minimal level of repression required if we think that are primary instincts are all bad (though the superid tries to oppose this), and that this minimal repression needs to be acceptable. Although this doesn't completely refute Freud's thought that civilization can only exist with repression, the reason it differs from Freud’s idea seems merely a matter of having a more positive attitude, in which we consciously deal with the fact that this repression needs to take place. Instead of getting frustrated, we rationally realize that its because of a greater satisfaction, of building human relations and manifesting our libidinal needs positively that the minimal repression is needed. This change in attitude would be similar to not frowning about our basic obligations but taking them smilingly in one’s stride. (By this I don’t mean that we accept surplus repression as well and smile about it, living with the illusion of freedom! (as explained on page 224).)

The issue of self-sublimation is confusing for me too. Is he talking about sublimating and repressing our libidinal desires but doing it ourselves, with self awareness, and hence not being governed by the id as an unconscious controller? The way this could change things is that we wouldn't perceive the essential labour required as being forced to do it but realize that it makes rational sense and hence we'd want to do it.

Alienated labour seems to refer to the work that is designed to take us away from our libidinal desires and aggressive base instincts. This creates frustration and makes us feel repressed. Unalienated labour on the other hand would give us a greater sense of freedom because we would be involved in activities that gratify us and that allow us to feel satisfied in their pursuit... On page 201, he mentions the "transformation of the libido", which involves the spread as opposed to the explosion of the libido. Since this process would require a structuring of society and institutions, its hard to conceive what the work relations in this set up would be like, but I think the main feature Marcuse would want to retain is that we realize our needs in the process of this work as opposed to feeling distressed about working because it has us repress our needs. On page 154, Marcuse indicates the change by altering 'instinctual repression' to 'instinctual liberation'. From Freud's perspective, it would seem that the process of liberation essentially involves something detrimental to civilization because of the nature of human impulses, and hence society couldn't sustain without repression (as opposed to liberating work).

I think the issue of reason becomes important here. Instead of viewing reason as something that makes us aware and behave rationally for a greater good, reason is considered superior due to its ability to suppress the libidinal needs and hence make humans grow beyond actions that look to satisfying the immediate needs (like eating that marshmallow instantly) . This latter perspective makes reason something repressive that makes us subdue our needs, while the former view of reason makes us understand why we should behave rationally and why that minimal repression in sensible for the sake of the greater satisfaction that we actually desire and that makes us feel free.
This is the perspective from which I'm seeing unalienated labour. There is a liberation of the instincts involved in here because we are choosing the kind of work that brings us gratification and not take us away from our needs.

While Freud might be confronting the dark side of human nature without hesitance, I think his theory makes us fear this darkness and the id because they control us (robbing us of freedom) and make us do things that would be destructive. However, Marcuse seems to be indicating towards a friendlier attitude towards nature and our libidinal needs, which the unalienated labour would embrace. The change of "socially useful 'labour'" to "socially useful 'work'" (154-55) might be an arbitrary one, but there is a difference between the connotation of 'labour' being the exertion of our faculties (bodily or mental) while 'work' involves actions/ deeds that are more rational and sensible.

I’m not sure if I’m grasping your last point exactly as you mean it, but I like the idea that beauty and art can be more than mere sublimations of our impulses because of their reflective nature. Art does not have any utility (it isn’t produced to satisfy a particular need, and is in that sense not useful), but it is instead desired as an intellectual need, as it helps us reflect upon our surroundings and to make sense of them. Hence, the process of production of art can involve recognizing the unconscious drives and perceptions we carry towards the external world and then depicting these objects in the sensuous form (paintings, music etc) with respect to this new perspective (as opposed to the production of something ‘useful’ like a hammer which only requires reflection upon how to hit the nail best). Hence, art, and the experience of beauty in art can help in revealing this tension of our unconscious drives to us.

My first interpretation of what the aura comprises of was not just the historical and traditional context a work of art lies in; I thought the aura resides mainly in the sensuous aspects of the moment or the place where the artwork lies (i.e. what we hear, see, read etc). So, as we withdraw things from their natural settings and have them pass through technical mediums, this original aura starts to decline making, which leads to the deprivation of authenticity.

Lucas, I think your point about freedom being a prerequisite to making positive or prescriptive statements (about how things should be), resonates a similar thought I had while reading this book. It seems as though rationality can no more be viewed as a separate part of our mind (along with appetites) because it arises out of our libidinal instincts to which we are bound, and we are hence not autonomous beings. If our ability to reason is actually a function of our libidinal instincts, we become bound to these instincts, and hence our pursuits, rational thoughts etc are all a product of these instincts. This makes us a consequence rather than independently acting agents.

The first two phenomena that Freud mentions (superior power of nature and feebleness of our bodies), already inhibit us from having absolute freedom (in the negative sense of having absolutely no constraints). The third phenomenon infringing our ability to pursue happiness, “our relations to other men” (26), seems to arise paradoxically. It seems to that civilizations initially come up as way of attaining freedom. Our need to survive leads to the “compulsion to work... created by external necessity” and this makes us view other men as fellow-workers who are useful to us (53) and our erotic nature makes us “unwilling to be deprived of the sexual object” (37). This foundational step towards the formation of a family and then civilization is in accordance with what Freud seems to think we would do if we were free: practice deeds which lead to our survival as well as sexual satisfaction. However, when we stop seeing these bonds between men and families as a way of channelizing our impulses (id), but instead see families and norms regulating social relationships as values to be upheld, then they start to feel like constraints (and perhaps functions like the superego). So, freedom seems to lie in prescribing to civilization, because without it we are continually contesting each other, which gives no value to liberty. At the same time “the replacement of the power of the individual by the power of the community constitutes the decisive step of civilization” (49) because the only way to sustain the usefulness of bringing people together is by moderating the aggressive nature of human beings. So I think freedom comes at the cost of some bondage, but this manifestation of freedom (with a slight trade of with some constraints) seems better than the state in which we have no constraints, because our competitive nature makes us less able to satisfy ourselves in that state. So in response to your question, I don’t think Freud would contend for freedom only in the negative sense, because I don’t see when that’s possible for us to have. However, engaging in acts which lead to a meaningful life and help us realize our goals (“engaging in high psychical activities, scientific, artistic or ideological” (51)) are rendered as an act of sublimation by Freud, and in subliming we are practising freedom and releasing our impulses to a lesser satisfactory extent than with negative freedom.

Alex, I’m a bit surprised that you sensed a lack of sensitivity towards evolutionary concepts in this book, because while reading through it, I was validating a lot of Freud’s statements about human behaviour because of their similarity to my understanding of primate socio-biology. Here is the main point that I was looking at: the final postulate of Darwin’s process of natural selection is differential survival and reproduction, according to which the individuals who can compete and acquire sources, as well as create more offspring are regarded as most adaptive. This seems to imply that libidinous and competitive behaviour facilitates our ability for survival, and hence it is consistent with the theory of evolution that we exhibit these tendencies. Freud seems to regard our most unrestrained impulses to be sexual ones (which would lead to offspring) as well as aggressive ones (which would let us compete and hence gather the limited resources). So, both the impulses that Freud thinks we are driven by seem to carry a purpose. While I do think that this seems to imply that we act hedonistically, I find it odd that mere gratification can lead to happiness (perhaps because we think of happiness as a more cerebral feeling). But I think Freud would say that since we can no more survive in a state where we freely exhibit aggressive and sexual impulses, we have to sublime them with “higher mental activities”, and because this is our present way of exhibited these impulses, we now think of happiness as lying in a mix of these ‘higher’ endeavours.

I agree with Jordan that by saying that love isn't 'good', Socrates is just trying to say that it isn't amongst the ideals like the Just, or the Truth, but rather something that's in between. In lacking the Good, love acquired this dynamic nature that propels it towards the Good and since it orients one towards the Good, it is a positive (good) thing. This can also explain the question Prof. Long had posed earlier in the semester, about what it means to keep searching for the Good (erotic relationship to it), when one believes that one will always be ignorant of it (lacking the Good).