Kyle S
41p65 comments posted · 3 followers · following 1
19 weeks ago @ Paul Kedrosky: Infecti... - Jeb Corlis -- PoV HD W... · 1 reply · +2 points
30 weeks ago @ Paul Kedrosky: Infecti... - Being a Patent Troll N... · 0 replies · +1 points
60 weeks ago @ Paul Kedrosky: Infecti... - 30-Year Soars! Or Some... · 0 replies · +1 points
76 weeks ago @ Burnham's Beat - Why Convertible Debt I... · 1 reply · +1 points
Separately, I have never understood why an early stage investor would demand any partial "refund" of their financing (whether interest payments or preferred dividends), as both consist of the return of, not on, invested capital until the company starts to pick up traction.
I've worked in many "hard asset" liquidations and even then no creditors are ever happy. I can't imagine what a liquidation of a startup whose assets consist primarily of ideas in programmers' heads would be like.
76 weeks ago @ Paul Kedrosky: Infecti... - QOTD: Civilization and... · 0 replies · +1 points
77 weeks ago @ Paul Kedrosky: Infecti... - Wall Street's "Ap... · 0 replies · +1 points
78 weeks ago @ Feld Thoughts - What Do You Hate The M... · 2 replies · +4 points
83 weeks ago @ Paul Kedrosky: Infecti... - U.S. Hotel Closures, 1... · 0 replies · +1 points
90 weeks ago @ Burnham's Beat - Carried Interest Deal ... · 1 reply · +1 points
90 weeks ago @ Burnham's Beat - Carried Interest Deal ... · 1 reply · +2 points
I am not in PE so this comes from my relatively naive perspective. That said, I disagree with your assertion above:
The fundamental problem for the government is that carried interest isn’t given to VCs by GPs for the hell of it, it is given to them because the VCs are investing all of their intangible assets (reputations, track records, networks, etc.) into each deal. LPs have traditionally valued these intangible assets enough to give VCs a 15–35% ownership stake in the partnership
I'm no LP, but if I were, I would want the GPs I invest with to have their incentives aligned with mine. Thus, 2+20 (rather than, say, 4% of AUM) makes sense as a compensation scheme because it more or less aligns GP compensation with LP returns. The "20" is just a form of compensation for performing the job of "venture capitalist."
Investment bankers, traders, and consultants "invest... all of their intangible assets (reputations, track records, networks, etc.) " into the deals they do as well, and often receive performance based compensation. That compensation varies with the success or failure of the "investment of their intangible assets" (as you phrase it) and yet it is nonetheless taxed as ordinary income and not a capital gain.
Maybe I have a naive view of LPs. My operating assumption is that they care about their GPs making less money for poor returns and more money for superior returns. I don't think they care a whit about what tax treatment their GPs receive. Am I wrong?
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